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Notes & Comments
Constitutional Home Rule in
Rhode Island
[TIhere is perhaps no term in the literature of political
science or law which is more susceptible to misconception
and variety of meaning than 'home rule.'1
Unfortunately, Rhode Island's Home Rule Amendment has
spent most of its half-century existence nearly dormant. Like all
home rule amendments, 2 Rhode Island's Home Rule Amendment
purports to bestow a certain degree of independent decision-
making authority upon towns and cities within the state. A
properly drafted home rule amendment affirms and even
supplements local authority in certain areas, while maintaining
overriding state authority where appropriate. The next step, of
course, is the interpretation and implementation of the
amendment in a way that honors the spirit of local authority over
local matters and allows for clear resolution of inevitable conflicts
between local authorities and state authorities. By its very nature
this second step is primarily undertaken by state courts. When
properly implemented using clear rules, home rule amendments
can encourage efficient governance by empowering local
authorities to make decisions and legislate in areas for which they
1. Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home
Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 644 (quoting CHICAGO
HOME RULE COMM'N, MODERNIZING A CITY GOVERNMENT 193 (1954)).
2. There are currently forty-two states, including Rhode Island, with
some form of home rule. SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTINEAU ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW § 21.01 (2d ed. 1997).
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are most properly suited. While the Rhode Island Supreme Court
was initially hostile towards the notion of home rule, it has slowly
begun to embrace the implications of home rule in Rhode Island
by carving out small areas of purely local concern over which
home rule communities may exercise control locally. I will argue
that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has made significant but
slow headway in implementing the Home Rule Amendment, a
trend which the court ought to continue by propounding clear
rules and affirming local decisions when appropriate. The
following discussion will begin with a general overview of the
development of home rule in the United States in Part I. The focus
will then turn to the history of home rule in the state of Rhode
Island in Part II. Finally, in Part III, the discussion will turn to a
more in-depth discussion of the application of Rhode Island's
Home Rule Amendment as it has progressed, and as it is applied
today.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HOME RULE IN AMERICA
The home rule movement in the United States has its roots in
the political turmoil of the late nineteenth century, when the
urbanization of the American population gave rise to ever larger
cities, and of course, all the complex needs that are associated
with such places.3 This is not to say, however, that local autonomy
only arose as a concern in the nineteenth century. In reality, the
idea that a distant state legislature would get involved in the
minute details of administering municipalities is impractical on
its face. Imagine a state legislature that is required to take action
each and every time a town needs to buy a new fire truck, paint
crosswalks, or hire a new town employee. The exigencies of day-to-
day municipal operations have always required a degree of
autonomy, and no state legislature would seek to usurp that
autonomy in its entirety.4 The practical need for some degree of
local autonomy does nothing, however, to define the limits of
either a municipality's autonomy or the state's ability to encroach
upon it. The resulting uncertainty for state and municipal
3. Michael Monroe Kellogg Sebree, Comment, One Century of
Constitutional Home Rule: A Progress Report?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 155, 156
(1989).
4. Sandalow, supra note 1, at 647.
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relations began to come to the forefront as the American economy
became more industrial and urban populations soared. State
legislatures became increasingly involved in local decision-
making, and states began to regulate to a degree and in ways they
simply never had. 5 In the face of this tension between municipal
autonomy and legislative encroachment, popular and scholarly
discussion began concerning the limits of state legislative
authority and the existence, if any, of local initiative. 6 It was
under these conditions that Missouri became the first state to pass
a constitutional home rule amendment in 1875. 7 The pressures
that led Missouri and many states thereafter to adopt home rule
are best understood in light of the generally accepted wisdom
concerning the status of municipalities before home rule.
A. Dillon's Rule: Municipality As Creature of the State
By the end of the nineteenth century, a clear rule had
developed concerning the limits of municipal power. This rule was,
in fact, a conception of municipal state relations which had been
long accepted but little noticed.8 Named for John Dillon, a much
respected legal scholar 9 who gave the rule its most recognized
formulation, Dillon's Rule recognizes the often stated proposition
that municipalities are mere creatures of the state. The rule as
stated in Dillon's Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations is
5. Id. ("It was during the second half of the nineteenth century that
state legislatures across the country established by usage the power which,
from the beginning, they had in theory. Legislation descended into regulation
of the minutest details of municipal government.").
6. Sebree, supra note 3, at 156-57.
7. Sandalow, supra note 1, at 644; Kenneth E. Vanlandingham,
Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 270
(1968).
8. Sebree, supra note 3, at 157.
9. John Forrest Dillon (1831-1914). Dillon was born in New York, but
moved to Iowa as a child. He was awarded an M.D. in 1850, but gave up the
practice of medicine in favor of law. He was elected to the Iowa Supreme
Court in 1862 on which he sat for eight years, ultimately as chief justice. In
1869 he was appointed as a circuit judge for the newly created Eighth
Circuit. In 1879 he resigned from the court and became a professor of law at
Columbia College. He is most remembered for his monumental TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1872) which established municipal
law as a separate field of study. 3 THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED
SOCIETIES, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 311 (Allen Johnson & Dumas
Malone eds., 1959) (1930).
20061
680 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.11:677
as follows:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a
municipal corporation possesses, and can exercise, the
following powers, and no others: First, those granted in
express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied
in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation - not simply convenient, but indispensable.1o
Dillon's Rule is obviously one of strict construction.11 When
doubt arises concerning the boundaries of power between a state
and a municipality, any conflicts will almost certainly be resolved
in favor of state legislation. 12 The beauty of the rule is that it
conforms to the common understanding that municipalities are
inferior creatures of the state, while at the same time it recognizes
the existence of very limited and derivative local authority in
decision-making.' 3 While the rule traces all municipal authority
directly back to the state's plenary legislative powers, it succeeds
in avoiding an overly simplistic view of this relationship, one
which might ignore historically entrenched and necessary
decision-making authority for municipalities. Municipalities can
and do make decisions on their own initiative, but the authority
under which such decisions are made is always granted by the
state, either expressly through legislation creating and regulating
the municipality, or indirectly as implied by the power expressly
granted because the decision-making is "indispensable" to the
purposes and objects of a municipality. In the final analysis,
Dillon's Rule boils down to a rule of strict construction concerning
the power of municipalities to regulate or make decisions
concerning local matters.
By the end of the nineteenth century, Dillon's Rule was
accepted by nearly every jurisdiction that considered the
question.1 4 The rule's popularity likely arose from the fact that it
10. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 55 (1872) (emphasis in original).
11. Willard D. Lorensen, Rethinking the West Virginia Municipal Code of
1969, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 653, 659 (1995).
12. Gary T. Schwartz, Reviewing and Revising Dillon's Rule, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1025 (1991).
13. Lorensen, supra note 11, at 658-59.
14. 1 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.40 (3d ed.
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is founded on accepted principles, and is relatively
straightforward in its application. 15 Any opposing view which
points to some inherent local autonomy or authority ultimately
suffers from uncertainty concerning limitations on municipal
authority.16 Courts almost universally opted for the certainty of
the traditional rule rather than some uncertain, and perhaps even
radical, notion of local autonomy. 17
Not surprisingly, Dillon's Rule was viewed with unhappy
suspicion by local politicians and citizens who viewed the
interference with local decision-making as an invitation for
distant state legislatures to pass self-serving regulations.18
Whether the perception is accurate, local politicians felt that they
had to protect their municipalities, both from usurpation of local
initiative and from meddling outsiders who were bent on filling
their own coffers through burdensome regulation.' 9 The resulting
movement, known as the home rule movement, had a variety of
aspects, both legal and political. 20 The popular political home rule
movement is beyond the scope of this Comment, except to say that
the goals and rhetoric of the popular movement have often lead to
confusion about exactly what is meant by "home rule" in the legal
context. 21 Home rule, in its constitutional and statutory sense,
refers simply to a particular system for distribution of power
between local and state governmental entities, and does not
necessarily suggest any sudden accretion of local authority,
despite what might be suggested by the exaggerated rhetoric of
the early political movement.22 Perhaps the best way to avoid
confusion concerning the ultimate legal effect of home rule is to
1999).
15. Lorensen, supra note 11, at 658-59.
16. David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255,
2277-79 (2003).
17. George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the
Exercise of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 24 STETSON L. REV. 417, 420-21
(1995).
18. Sandalow, supra note 1, at 648.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 651 ("Moreover, failure to keep the distinction between the two
aspects of home rule clearly in view has resulted in considerable confusion as
to the extent to which correctives are needed for present home rule
doctrines.").
22. Id. at 664.
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carefully consider the dual purposes of home rule as it is applied
in both the historical and contemporary context.23
B. The Two Distinct Functions of Home Rule
Home rule, in the constitutional and statutory context, is
frequently broken into two clearly distinguishable functions.24
First, home rule may involve restrictions on the power of the state
legislature to legislate concerning local municipal governments.25
Second, home rule often involves a grant to municipalities of
authority to act in certain very limited circumstances without
prior authorization from the state legislature. 26 The logical
distinction between how a state legislature may act in relation to
a municipality, and how a municipality may act on its own, is
extremely important in clarifying what exactly the effects of home
rule will be in a particular context.
The limitation of state power in relation to municipalities
most commonly takes the form of a limitation on local or special
legislation. 27 This limitation means that state legislatures must
limit themselves to regulations that apply equally to all towns and
cities. 28 The theory is that this will prevent state legislatures from
regulating within the minutia of daily municipal operations. This,
of course, does nothing to prevent state legislatures from passing
very specific regulations which apply alike to all cities and
23. Id. at 651-52 ("[E]numeration of the areas deemed not to be of
statewide concern would have been far more meaningful than enumeration of
subjects intended to be included within the initiative power of
municipalities.").
24. Michele Timmons, Judy Grant, Teri Popp & Heidi Westby, County
Home Rules Comes to Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 811, 816 (1993).
Accord STEVENSON, supra note 2, at § 21.02 (stating the two principle ways
that home rule can be important to local governments).
25. STEVENSON, supra note 2, at § 21.01.
26. Id.
27. Sandalow, supra note 1, at 648.
28. The circumstances under which a state legislature is prohibited from
passing such local legislation vary. For instance, in many states the
proscription would apply only to cities which have home rule authority. Many
states, including Rhode Island, require that a municipality pass a home rule
charter before being granted home rule authority. Until the town or city
passes such a charter, it will have a statutory charter and is subject to special
legislation concerning any and all details of its local operation. See, e.g.,
Opinion to the House of Representatives, 87 A.2d 693, 695 (R.I. 1952).
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towns.29 Such a limitation does function, nonetheless, to provide a
certain degree of restraint on the power of a state legislature to
act in relation to any particular municipality.
Another common home rule limitation on the power of state
legislatures is a proscription on legislation concerning form of
municipal government.30 This limitation presumably prevents a
state legislature from dictating how a municipality will organize
itself.31 Unlike proscriptions on local legislation, limitations on
interference with municipal form of government cannot be so
clearly defined. Questions about what exactly constitutes form of
government are hard to sort out, especially in the context of
preemption analysis. 32 Therefore, while this protection is often
included as a limitation on state legislative authority in a home
rule scheme, it is less significant in terms of practical impact.
The second function of home rule, to bestow upon
municipalities the authority to act in certain areas independent of
state authorization, generally involves some attempt to define
29. Sandalow, supra note 1, at 649 (quoting McBain, The Law and the
Practice of Municipal Home Rule). One can imagine any number situations
where legislation involves details of municipal operation but applies to all
towns and cities. For example, Rhode Island's general laws contain a statute
requiring that tickets issued for non-moving violations in a town or city
contain "the specific violation charged, the schedules of fines for the violation,
the time within which the privilege of paying the fine by mail may be
exercised, and the place to which the fine may be mailed." R.I. GEN. LAWS §
45-6.1-7 (2005) (originally passed as a public law in 1965).
30. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (1986).
31. See STEVENSON, supra note 2, at § 22.06.
32. It is often difficult to sort out whether a particular function of a
municipal board or committee is attached to its form of government. In Rhode
Island, for instance, the problem arises when contracting with certain local
employees, especially police personnel. It is generally accepted in Rhode
Island that police personnel ultimately fall under the control of the state
legislature because they act under the General Assembly's broad and historic
police power. Rhode Island courts have therefore generally found that the
state can divest local boards of authority to regulate and contract with local
police. Interpretation of conflicts in this fashion has rendered invocations of
the protection against legislation concerning local form of government
generally unsuccessful in Rhode Island. See Marro v. Gen. Treasurer of
Cranston, 273 A.2d 660, 662 (R.I. 1971) ("[Tlhey are officers who perform a
state duty and are subject to full control by the state."). See also Munroe v.
East Greenwich, 733 A.2d 703, 711 (R.I. 1999) ("The requirement that each
city and town repose certain duties in a 'planning board' with the function of
review conferred upon the zoning board of review acting as a board of appeal,
does not affect the town form of government.").
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exactly what authority has been granted and the manner in which
it may be claimed and exercised. 33 Often, vague terms like "local
matters"34 or "local affairs"35 are used to describe the subject
matter upon which a municipality has decision-making authority.
Because there is often little useful guidance concerning what
might be considered a "local" concern, decisions about whether
particular matters are "local" are often left to the courts.36 For this
reason, the degree to which home rule truly broadens local
authority is often a question which can only be answered in time
as courts develop rules and categories to tackle the difficult
question of what kinds of concerns are "local" and therefore within
the purview of a municipality's authority. 37
In addition to granting initiative concerning particular
matters, constitutions often establish a process by which a town
may create and pass a home rule charter which spells out in
greater detail the specific authority which will be exercised by the
municipality.38 In this way, home rule becomes an option in which
a municipality may or may not elect to participate. Once a charter
is in effect, a municipality's authority will usually be limited by its
charter, in much the same way a legislature is limited by the
constitution of its state.39
This system of limitations and empowerments is why a home
rule system is attractive. The primary benefit of home rule is that
it allows local government to operate independently in areas
where it is best suited to innovate. By the same token, home rule
acts to strictly limit local government action so that it cannot
affect those outside of the local government. In addition, the
residents of a town or city have the ability to create a charter
which can provide limits specific to the needs and desires of a
33. Sandalow, supra note 1, at 648. See also STEVENSON, supra note 2, at
§ 21.02.
34. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (1986) (using the words "in all local
matters").
35. Sandalow, supra note 1, at 660.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 661-63.
38. See Timmons, supra note 24, at 823-27.
39. Home rule analysis in any particular instance will often involve
questions about the scope of authority actually granted by a municipal
charter. Questions about the process by which a charter will be interpreted
and expounded are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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particular town. The result, when properly implemented, is more
efficient government on both the local and state levels.
From here the discussion turns to the specific Rhode Island
home rule provisions. Going forward, it is important to keep in
mind the dual purposes of home rule: to limit legislative authority
and to define municipal initiative. The distinction between what
the state may do on the one hand, and what the municipality may
do on the other, is always significant in attempting to understand
the effect of home rule in any particular situation.
II. THE HISTORY OF RHODE ISLAND'S HOME RULE AMENDMENT
The arrival of home rule in Rhode Island cannot be
adequately understood without first contemplating Rhode Island's
peculiar history, before and after statehood, leading up to the 1951
passage of the Home Rule Amendment. Rhode Island's history
sheds light on the particular meaning of home rule in this state,
and it breathes a certain life into contemporary interpretation of
home rule in Rhode Island. To that end, this section will provide a
short history of the relations between town and state in Rhode
Island leading up to the passage of the Home Rule Amendment,
followed by a short introduction to the language of the
Amendment itself.
A. Rhode Island's Peculiar History
"In Rhode Island the towns came first. They designed the
colonial government, and altered it several times. . . ."40 This fact,
that Rhode Island was initially a loose collection of virtually
independent towns, makes Rhode Island a particularly suitable
setting for a discussion on the limits of local authority. This, of
course, is only part of the story. The Colony of Rhode Island
underwent a series of political changes as it repeatedly modified
and changed royal charters, the last of which endured well after
the revolution and into the nineteenth century.41 Rhode Island's
tumultuous history begins as the story of a colony slowly forming
40. SYDNEY V. JAMES, THE COLONIAL METAMORPHOSES IN RHODE ISLAND: A
STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS IN CHANGE 40 (Sheila L. Kemp & Bruce C. Daniels
eds., 2000).
41. WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, RHODE ISLAND: A HISTORY 127 (The States
and The Nation Series ed., 1986) (1978).
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from a loose association of towns and cities.42 Ultimately, for
reasons too complicated to be adequately covered here, a very
powerful state legislature was formed which has, at times, been
the subject of controversy and even popular revolt. The resulting
historical tension in Rhode Island between a powerful state
legislature and the towns that preceded its creation will be the
focus of the discussion to follow.
The Colony of Rhode Island43 began as five distinct
settlements.44 In the beginning, these towns were basically
independent outposts. 45 These outposts began to rely on one
another in a variety of ways, but the ultimate desire to form a
colonial federation was rooted in a desire to combine forces against
outsiders seeking to annex and control the region. 46 In this way,
seventeenth-century Rhode Island was actually a group of fiercely
independent settlements united in defense against a group of
common enemies.47 This desire to unite was not, however,
expressed through any lessened desire on the part of the
settlements to control their own fates.48 Fierce independence,
especially religious, was a defining characteristic of these early
settlements. 49 It is difficult, perhaps unreasonable, to imagine
that this historical tradition of independent self-government did
42. Id. at 3. ("Its formative years, 1636 to 1690, were marked by two
simultaneous struggles: the search for unity among these diverse settlements
around Narragansett Bay and the resistance of settlers there to efforts by the
neighboring colonies to assume authority over their land.").
43. McLoughlin says of Roger Williams' initial arrival in Bristol, "Here,
on Mount Hope, Williams' friend Ousamequin (Massasoit), chief of the
Wampanoags, had his winter headquarters." MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at
8. Quite obviously, the short history presented here does not start at the
beginning of civilization in what is now Rhode Island. That being said, this
Comment will surely reflect to some degree the solipsistic bent of the
conquerors' history.
44. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 3. The settlements were Providence,
Pocasset (Portsmouth), Newport, Pawtuxet, and Shawomet (Warwick).
45. JAMES, supra note 40, at 15 ("In the founding years, the original
towns independently carried on their own disputes according to their own
dynamics.").
46. Id. at 40-41. See also McLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 27-28 ("In order
to fend off the imperialistic ambitions of these aggressive neighbors, Rhode
Islanders began to see the necessity of some form of union. And that required
a charter from the king.").
47. JAMES, supra note 40, at 40-41.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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not affect the way that Rhode Islanders related to Dillon's Rule
and the subsequent home rule response.
Rhode Island's first charter was acquired by Roger Williams
in 1644 and was granted by the English Parliament.50 It was
perhaps lucky for Roger Williams that King Charles I had been
run out of London just a couple of years earlier, leaving Williams
free to bargain for favorable terms with a sympathetic
Parliament. 51 The terms of this first charter essentially left
decisions concerning form of government to the towns
themselves.5 2 In fact, the charter seemed to create a kind of
federation of towns, relying in large part on government by
referendum.5 3 It is not necessary to delve deeply into the
mechanics of the government created and repeatedly modified
under this initial charter, except to say that it was one clearly
focused on local authority and decision-making. Again, it is hard
to imagine that this early experience of a colony ruled by towns
operating in nearly complete independence did not affect the way
Rhode Islanders thought about Dillon's Rule and home rule. 54
Early colonial history in Rhode Island under the charter
granted in 1644 was tumultuous, which is understandable given
the fiercely independent and widely varying views of its early
50. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 28.
51. Id. ("Being himself a Puritan... a friend of Oliver Cromwell, Sir
Henry Vane, John Milton, and other leaders of the Puritan movement,
Williams had immediate access to power that he would have lacked had the
king been in charge.").
52. JAMES, supra note 40, at 42.
53. See Newport v. Horton, 41 A. 312, 313 (R.I. 1900). ("The form of
government adopted under [the 1644] charter was a federation of towns
rather than a colony. Legislation originated in the towns and the general
assembly had simply the power of approval or veto. Local self-government
was preserved to its full extent."). Consider also James' description of the
system of proposing and validating legislation: "A town might propose a new
law by majority vote. Then the town recorder would send a copy of it to each
of the other towns to be voted upon. If a majority of the total votes cast
favored the proposal, it would be declared a law until the next General
Assembly (court of election), when a general vote on the proposal would be
taken." JAMES, supra note 40, at 43.
54. As an introduction to home rule in Rhode Island, it is not necessarily
the purpose of this Comment to offer a comprehensive explanation of the
relationship between Rhode Island's early history and the meaning and
interpretation of the Home Rule Amendment, but rather to provide a broad
view of state/municipal relations in the state.
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inhabitants. 55 Whether it was the weak government formed under
the early charter, the restoration of Charles II to the throne in
England, or yet another unknown cause is not clear; whatever the
reason the colony chose to seek a second charter in 1663.56 This
second charter took a form similar to those of the surrounding
colonies, with a core of magistrates and locally elected deputies
who, when combined in the General Assembly, wielded a great
deal of authority. 57 The result on paper was a much more powerful
central government, but because of local resistance it would be
many years before there were actual results.58 Regardless, this
charter granted in 1663 lasted until a new state government was
organized under the constitution adopted by the people of Rhode
Island in 1842. 59 Remarkably, a charter granted by Charles II over
110 years before the American Revolution was the constituting
authority of Rhode Island for almost 180 years, lasting sixty-six
years beyond the end of the Revolution.
The Charter of 1663, as has already been noted, did not
immediately give rise to a powerful central government. In fact,
the colony went through a great deal of turmoil during the forty or
so years following the acquisition of the Charter of 1663.60 At the
end of the seventeenth century and into the early eighteenth
century, however, the colony of Rhode Island came into its own,
and during this period the towns slowly lost their autonomous
influence, while the colonial government began to centralize its
power by moving more and more towards the kind of powerful
General Assembly that was anticipated by the Charter of 1663.61
55. JAMES, supra note 40, at 53-54.
56. Id. at 48-49. It would certainly have been desirable to seek the
blessing of Charles II, especially considering the tremendous border tensions
during this time. The map on page 41 of McLoughlin's Rhode Island: A
History is a good visual aid in understanding the magnitude of the various
disputes.
57. See JAMES, supra note 40, at 49-50.
58. For an excellent discussion of the factors concerning early colonial
ineffectiveness see the section in James' history concerning the period right
after the acquisition of the charter in 1663 at pages 53-63.
59. See Providence v. Moulton, 160 A. 75, 77-78 (R.I. 1932).
60. JAMES, supra note 40, at 112.
61. Id. It seems relatively clear that the need for centralized authority to
regulate commerce was at the heart of this change. James says of the central
government: "[It] was the star performer. It recovered after 1695 and soon
raced ahead .... It truly began to exercise the powers assigned to it by the
charter.. . ." Id. James goes on to say of the town governments that "[t]heir
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It continued to be the case at the beginning of the eighteenth
century that, as Sydney James wrote in his history of Rhode
Island institutions, "[c]entralized authority rested on consent
rather than force."62 In other words, the General Assembly had
begun to wrest control from the towns, but it could do so only in
limited ways that would avoid upsetting the delicate balance that
had arisen between the towns and the colonial government.63 It is
especially interesting to note that it was during this period that
the General Assembly began to grant town charters, which the
towns claimed could not be infringed upon without a legal
proceeding. 64 At the same time, the towns began to recognize their
status in relationship to the central authority, marking the end of
a period of autonomous towns and the beginning of a more unified,
centralized, government while the economy became more focused
on commerce and trade.65
The period from the Revolution into the nineteenth century
represents a period of sudden economic prosperity in Rhode
Island, coupled with extremely slow social and political change. 66
The result was a growing disparity between the rights of wealthier
land owners and those of poor and more recently arrived
immigrants. 67 These pressures, especially those associated with
the limited franchise for those newly arrived, ultimately led to a
popular uprising commonly referred to as Dorr's Rebellion. 68
business fell increasingly under regulation by colonial law, they stressed
procedural formality more than before, and they began to act more like
administrative arms of the central government and less like agencies of
communities." Id. at 112-13.
62. Id. at 131.
63. Id.
64. Id. ("This concept of privilege, while a product of views about a
hierarchy of authority, served as a barrier to unfettered central power."). It is
equally interesting that these early charters often contain expressions that
mirror the later formulation of Dillon's Rule. For example, the charter
granted during this period to Newport gave the freemen of that town the
authority to act on "prudential affairs in passing acts and orders for the duly
governing affairs only properly needful and necessary for said town, and
proper and allowable for said town."' Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
65. JAMES, supra note 40, at 68-69. See also McLOUGHLIN, supra note 41,
at 50-51.
66. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 109.
67. Id. at 109-10.
68. Id. at 126-28. The Dorr Rebellion was the culmination of a myriad of
historical factors resulting largely from the preservation of an antiquated,
2006]
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Thomas Dorr's69 attempt to supplant the then-government of
Rhode Island with a newly constituted government was
unsuccessful, but popular pressure ultimately resulted in the
adoption of a state constitution and the formation of a state
government much like the one currently in place in Rhode
Island.70 The power of the General Assembly by this period was
great and the passage of the constitution in 1842 did not
necessarily result in a great limitation on that power. This is the
most significant aspect of this period of history for our purposes,
inequitable, and highly centralized political system. This political system
combined with rampant xenophobia would produce inevitable violent conflict.
An editorial piece from the Providence Journal authored by Henry Anthony
and William Goddard on the eve of a constitutional referendum gives a sense
of the times: "Now is the time to choose between these two systems. Where
will you place the great conservative check in our government? With
foreigners responsible only to their priests, or with intelligent Rhode Island
Farmers?" Patrick T. Conley, The Dorr Rebellion and American
Constitutional Theory: Popular Constituent Sovereignty, Political Questions,
and Luther v. Borden, in LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF LAW AND
LAWYERS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1636-1998, 244, 251 (Patrick T. Conley ed., 1998).
69. Thomas Wilson Dorr (1805-1854). Best known as the leader of the
"Dorr Rebellion," Dorr graduated from Harvard second in his class before
studying law in New York. Dorr was a state legislator and state Democratic
Party chairman before becoming governor under the so-called "People's
Constitution." Dorr favored a system of "free suffrage" which would not
withhold the vote from foreign-born residents of the state. When Democrats
regained control of the General Assembly in 1935 for the first time in eighty-
one years, Governor Green said this change was inspired by "the spiritual
presence of the patron saint of the Democratic Party in Rhode Island -
Thomas Wilson Dorr!" Patrick T. Conley, Attorney Thomas Dorr: Rhode
Island's Foremost Political Reformer, in LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF
LAW AND LAWYERS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1636-1998, supra note 68, at 239, 241.
70. It is interesting to note that much of the controversy concerning
Dorr's Rebellion seems to have been associated with a feeling that the
Charter of 1663 was deeply undemocratic. In a much studied document
known as "Burke's Report to the House of Representatives," that charter is
uniformly condemned: "It invested all power in the grantees, and clothed
them with exclusive political as well as corporate privileges and authority; in
short, it abrogated the democratic government established by the charter of
1643, and created an OLIGARCHY in its stead as pure in its oligarchic
characteristics as any which have existed in the States of Greece, or the
misnamed Italian republics of later times. And such has been the government
of Rhode Island in substance, whatever may have been its ostensible form,
from the acceptance of the charter of Charles II to its final death and burial
in the popular movements of 1842...." H.R. REP. No. 546, at 8 (1844)
(emphasis in original).
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namely the General Assembly's greatly centralized authority.71
The emphasis on Rhode Island's general history leading up to
Dorr's Rebellion is, in many respects, centrally focused on the
relationship between town and state authority. At this point in the
analysis, the focus on home rule is better served by a shift to a
discussion of the early Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions
concerning the relationship between municipal and state
authority.
B. Pre-Home Rule Cases
Early decisions concerning state/municipal relations in Rhode
Island before the passage of the Home Rule Amendment in 1951
embraced a view which was entirely consistent with Dillon's Rule.
A quick look at just a few of those decisions should give an idea of
how Rhode Island's history affected the judicial view of
state/municipal relations, and also just how strict that view
became.
One early Rhode Island Supreme Court decision, City of
Newport v. Horton,72 is a particularly good example of how colonial
history in Rhode Island ultimately reinforced a limited
understanding of local authority. 73 In Horton, the court was asked
to decide "whether the general assembly has power to create a
police commission, to be appointed by the governor, which can
appoint a chief of police." 74 The City of Newport claimed that
towns and villages in Rhode Island have a long history of local
self-government. 75 In analyzing this claim of self-government, the
court looked to the history of Rhode Island and the progression of
colonial charters to support the ultimate conclusion that the City
71. The struggle for reform in Rhode Island exemplified a feeling among
immigrants all over the country that equality would be achieved through
political self-determination, a sentiment which in turn helped to drive the
home rule movement in mostly immigrant urban areas. One Irish-American
newspaper in New York City even said of the reform movement in Rhode
Island: "It is our own Home Rule question." Conley, supra note 68, at 253.
72. 61 A. 759 (R.I. 1905).
73. 47 A. 312 (R.I. 1900). Accord Horton v. Newport, 61 A. 759 (R.I.
1905).
74. 47 A. at 312.
75. Id. at 313 (describing petitioners as claiming that local self
government is "fundamental and historic" in Rhode Island).
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of Newport has not retained authority over its police force. 76 The
Horton court, however, did not make any broad claims about what
local authority in fact might exist, but its reasoning seems to point
to the existence of at least some degree of local initiative.77
Only thirty-two years after the decision in Horton, in City of
Providence v. Moulton, the court expressed an even more limited,
perhaps even extreme, view of local autonomy in Rhode Island
based in large part on the state's constitutional history.78 The
court in Moulton affirmed state legislation creating a "Board of
Public Safety" for the City of Providence which replaced certain
locally appointed officials with officials appointed by the
governor. 79 The court again reviewed the history of Rhode Island
and came to the somewhat startling conclusion that "cities and
towns have no inherent right of local government."8 0 The court in
that case also directly cited Dillon's Rule,81 thus completing the
shift in Rhode Island from a small federation of independent and
self-governed towns to a state, like most others, in which towns
are limited entirely by whatever authority the state might choose
to grant them.
C. The Passage of the Amendment
The Home Rule Amendment was one of a small number of
amendments put forward at the limited constitutional convention
of 1951.82 While the political forces that led to the ultimate
76. Id. at 313-14 ("We do not find that the history of legislation in this
State shows that the clause relating to the powers 'retained by the people'
necessarily implies that the General Assembly has no right to pass a law
affecting a particular town or city.").
77. Id. at 314. ("Towns and cities are recognized in the constitution, and
doubtless they have rights which cannot be infringed. What the full limit and
scope of those rights may be cannot be determined in the decision of this
case.").
78. 160 A. 75, 75 (R.I. 1932).
79. Id. at 75-77.
80. Id. at 78. The court points in large part to the tremendous authority
that the 1663 charter placed in the state government, but pays little or no
regard to what actual authority the state wielded under that instrument, or
the slow progression of state/municipal relations. Id.
81. Id. at 79. Cf. Nixon v. Malloy, 161 A. 135 (R.I. 1932) (holding that city
of Central Falls had no authority over its board of canvassers being strictly
limited by the authority granted by the General Assembly).
82. Proceedings of the Limited Constitutional Convention of the State of
Rhode Island (Rhode Island Secretary of State) (1951).
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drafting of the amendment are complicated enough to justify a
study in themselves, it is clear that the amendment was popular.83
In fact, any minor dissention appearing in the record originated
with forces complaining that the version of the amendment put
forth at the convention was not adequate.8 4 This suggestion seems
to have met with little acceptance85 and the resolution passed
unanimously with 170 ayes.86
The Home Rule Amendment was Article XXVII of the
amendments to the Rhode Island Constitution until 1986.87 The
plenary constitutional convention of 1986 overhauled the then-
existing constitution and removed the Home Rule Amendment to
Article XIII, where it remains today.88
D. The Text of Rhode Island's Home Rule Amendment
The following is excerpted from the 2005 version of the Rhode
Island Constitution.8 9 Only those sections of most relevance to the
discussion at hand have been included.
§ 1. Intent of article
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to
the people of every city and town in this state the right of
self government in all local matters.
83. The motion to pass the resolution pertaining to the Home Rule
Amendment was seconded by no less than thirteen delegates to the
convention. Id. at 125-26.
84. "Mr. Harold R. Smith, Cranston:.. .I sincerely believe that the
amendment offered by the Governor's conferees does not go far enough and
that the people of Rhode Island would like to have a more liberal home rule
amendment. . ." Id. at 128. The most serious issue of contention appears to
have been the power of cities to levy and collect taxes. Id. at 130.
85. Mr. Smith, see supra note 84, seems to have been the butt of some
humor concerning his passionate views on home rule. "This humor that I
hear does not bother me. My resolution relative to home rule is a product of
many, many years of research and study by hundreds of capable, responsible
people throughout this country." Id. at 129.
86. Id. at 131. Apparently Mr. Smith was willing to take what he could
get.
87. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 628 A.2d
537, 538 (R.I. 1993).
88. Id.
89. R.I. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1-11 (1986).
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§ 2. Local legislative powers
Every city and town shall have the power at any time to
adopt a charter, amend its charter, enact and amend local
laws relating to its property, affairs and government not
inconsistent with this Constitution and laws enacted by
the general assembly in conformity with the powers
reserved to the general assembly.
§ 4. Powers of general assembly over cities and towns
The general assembly shall have the power to act in
relation to the property, affairs and government of any
city or town by general laws which shall apply alike to all
cities and towns, but which shall not affect the form of
government of any city or town. The general assembly
shall also have the power to act in relation to the
property, affairs and government of a particular city or
town provided that such legislative action shall become
effective only upon approval by a majority of the qualified
electors of the said city or town voting at a general or
special election, except that in the case of acts involving
the imposition of a tax or the expenditure of money by a
town the same shall provide for the submission thereof to
those electors in said town qualified to vote upon a
proposition to impose a tax or for the expenditure of
money.
§ 5. Local taxing and borrowing powers
Nothing contained in this article shall be deemed to grant
to any city or town the power to levy, assess and collect
taxes or to borrow money, except as authorized by the
general assembly.
§ 7. Adoption of charters
Within one year from the date of the election of the
charter commission the charter framed by the
commission shall be submitted to the legislative body of
the city or town which body shall provide for publication
of said charter and shall provide for the submission of
said charter to the electors of a city or town qualified to
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vote for general state officers at the general election next
succeeding thirty days from the date of the submission of
the charter by the charter commission. If said charter is
approved by a majority of said electors voting thereon, it
shall become effective upon the date fixed therein.
§ 8. Amendments to charters
The legislative body of any city or town may propose
amendments to a charter which amendments shall be
submitted for approval in the same manner as provided
in this article for the adoption of a charter except that the
same may be submitted at a special election, and
provided further that in the case of a town, amendments
concerning a proposition to impose a tax or for the
expenditure of money, shall be submitted at a special or
regular financial town meeting.
§ 11. Judicial powers unaffected by article
The judicial powers of the state shall not be diminished
by the provisions of this article.
III. APPLICATION OF RHODE ISLAND'S HOME RULE AMENDMENT
A. Early Decisions Restricting Home Rule Initiative
The 1951 passage of the Home Rule Amendment in Rhode
Island was attended shortly thereafter by confusion and concern
about the ultimate effect of the Amendment. The General
Assembly was unclear about what authority it retained, what
authority was granted to home rule municipalities, and ultimately
what sort of state legislation concerning municipalities would or
would not be upheld by the courts.9 0 The General Assembly almost
90. It is interesting to note that the General Assembly seems to have
recognized immediately that the Home Rule Amendment simply could not be
interpreted without aid from the judiciary because it lacked guidelines as to
what matters are appropriate for local action. In short order, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court made the prominent judicial role explicit, "Instead [the
Home Rule Amendment] leaves to the courts the responsibility of resolving
the conflicts where the state and municipality have each legislated on the
same subject matter." Marro v. Gen. Treasurer of Cranston, 273 A.2d 660,
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immediately propounded questions to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court in an attempt to clear up uncertainty, and then propounded
another set of questions to the Supreme Court a year later.91
The first Opinion to the House of Representatives92 was sent to
the House of Representatives in April of 1952. The questions sent
to the court, of which there were two, were extremely broad. 93 As
a result, the advisory opinion is so general that it provides little
guidance concerning the change wrought by the Amendment. It
would seem that the General Assembly was so nervous about the
limits of its authority and the degree to which it had been
deprived of authority that it simply could not wait for practical
questions to arise.
This advisory opinion does, however, serve to reinforce a
couple of points. First, it emphasizes a clear distinction between
municipalities before and after they pass a home rule charter,
making clear that the provisions of the Home Rule Amendment do
not result in any automatic change in the status of Rhode Island
municipalities. 94 Second, the opinion makes clear that once a
home rule charter has been adopted, the General Assembly may
act in certain areas of local concern only in either of two ways: (1)
by a general act that applies equally to all towns and cities, or (2)
by a special act directed to a particular town or city which is
662 (R.I. 1971).
91. Opinion to the House of Representatives, 96 A.2d 627 (R.I. 1953);
Opinion to the House of Representatives, 87 A.2d 693 (R.I. 1952).
92. 87 A.2d 693 (R.I. 1952).
93.
1. In the light of Article XXVIII of the articles of amendment to the
constitution of the state would it be a valid exercise of the legislative
power if the general assembly should provide
(a) for the tenure of office of any employee, elected or appointed, of
any city or town;
(b) for the fixing of the time of the holding of any town meeting;
(c) for the fixing of the time of the beginning and the end of the fiscal
year of any city or town;
(d) for the regulation of the use of parking meter devices in any city
or town?
2. Is a law incorporating a city or town enacted before the adoption
of Article XXVIII of the articles of amendment to the constitution of
the state a 'charter' subject to the provisions of said Article XXVIII?
Id. at 695.
94. Id. at 695-96; see also Capone v. Nunes, 132 A.2d 80, 82 (R.I. 1957).
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approved by the majority of the qualified electors of that town or
city.95 Because the advisory opinion primarily concerned the
General Assembly's authority after the Home Rule Amendment,
the court emphasized limitations on special legislation rather than
defining what matters will be considered local concerns for the
purpose of home rule authority. The court emphasized the power
retained by the General Assembly, noting that the only absolute
restriction that the Home Rule Amendment places on legislative
authority is a prohibition on legislation that might affect the form
of a municipal government.96
By April of 1953, the General Assembly was focusing in on the
reservation of power to the General Assembly concerning
municipal elections, and the resulting Opinion to the House of
Representatives further set the tone for early judicial
interpretation of home rule in Rhode Island.97 The opinion was in
response to fifteen questions propounded by the House of
Representatives, 98 which the court broke into three general
95. Opinion to the House, 87 A.2d at 696-97.
96. Id. at 696.
97. 96 A.2d at 627.
98. The questions propounded are far too voluminous to be included here
in their entirety. The drafters apparently forgot the first rule of good writing
- know thy audience. The following excerpt more than suffices to capture the
tone:
1. Are provisions for non-partisan nominations or elections or
elections by ballots bearing no party designations in a charter duly
adopted by the qualified electors of a city in accordance with the
provisions of Article XXVIII of the Amendments to the Constitution,
in conflict with, repugnant to, or inconsistent with the provisions of
Section 4 of said Article XXVIII of the Amendments to the
Constitution reserving to the General Assembly the power to
legislate in matters not affecting the form of government of any city?
2. Are provisions for non-partisan nominations or elections or
elections by ballots bearing no party designations in a duly adopted
charter in conflict with the provisions of Section 7 of Article XXIX of
the Amendments to the Constitution providing that the General
Assembly shall have full power to prescribe the manner of
conducting elections?
3. If either or both of the above questions are answered in the
affirmative, and such charter provides that if any part thereof is held
to be unconstitutional, it shall not affect the validity of the
remainder, are nomination and elections in the city adopting the
charter to be made and held in accordance with the law applicable
prior to the adoption of the charter?
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categories: (1) the validity of any home rule charter requirement
that town nominations and elections be nonpartisan, (2) the
validity of any home rule charter provision setting the times for
holding municipal general elections, and finally (3) the validity of
a home rule charter provision specifying the number of signatures
necessary on municipal nominating papers.99 The court answered
all three categories of questions by affirming the post-home-rule
plenary power of the General Assembly concerning the conduct of
all elections, including municipal general elections.100 The opinion
based its conclusion on two primary foundations. First, the court
pointed to the "long history of the general assembly's exclusive
authority over the conduct of elections, which was expressly
reaffirmed by article XXIX of amendments. " 10 Second, the court
6. If a duly adopted charter provides for holding municipal general
elections at times other than those fixed by acts of the General
Assembly applicable to that city, is such charter provision in
violation of or inconsistent with the provisions of Section 4 of Article
XXVIII of the amendments to the Constitution reserving to the
General Assembly the power to legislate in matters not affecting the
form of government of any city? * * *
14. Are provisions in a duly adopted charter prescribing criminal
penalties for violation of prohibitions in said charter in conflict with
the provisions of Section 4 of Article XXVIII of the Amendments to
the Constitution reserving in the General Assembly the power to
legislate in matters not affecting the form of government of any city?
15. Are provisions in a duly adopted charter prohibiting a resident of
that city holding office in or being employed by the State or Federal
government, except notaries public and members of the militia or
armed forces, from making any contract with the city or sharing in
the profits of any person or corporation making any contract with
the city in conflict with the provisions of
(a) Section 4 of Article XXVIII of the Amendments to the
Constitution reserving to the General Assembly the power to
legislate in matters not affecting the form of government of any city?
(b) the privileges and immunities clause of Article XIV of the
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States?
Id. at 627-29.
99. Id. at 629.
100. Id. at 630.
101. Id. The court will always strictly construe the Home Rule
Amendment if a conflict arises with any other constitutionally reserved
authority. See Royal v. Barry, 160 A.2d 572, 575 (R.I. 1960) ("Article XII of
the constitution expressly and affirmatively reserves to the legislature sole
responsibility in the field of education and nothing contained in article
XXVIII is in derogation thereof.").
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narrowly interpreted any control over elections granted to
municipalities under the Home Rule Amendment, stating that
such authority is "expressly limited to 'the nomination and
election of a charter commission."' 10 2 The reasoning seems to have
derived in part from a certain deference towards the General
Assembly's historic and broad plenary authority, as discussed
supra in Part IIA. Significantly, the court's reasoning further
suggests that Dillon's Rule, with its strict derivative
understanding of municipal authority, partially survives in Rhode
Island's post-home-rule jurisprudence.103 This is not to say that
the 1953 advisory opinion explicitly refers to Dillon's Rule.
Rather, it adopts the view that the language in the Amendment
must be strictly construed to avoid infringing on the reserved
powers, namely the power to control elections, of the General
Assembly. 0 4 While it may be possible to view this opinion as
narrowly focused on municipal general elections, a cautious and
restrictive understanding of the Amendment continued to be a
hallmark of early Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions
concerning home rule.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's strict limitation on home
rule power early on is exemplified by the case of Newport
Amusement Co. v. Maher,10 5 in which the court held that home
rule municipalities do not have even limited licensing authority
for local businesses. 0 6 The court in that case ruled on a local
ordinance in the city of Newport which purported to require that
all businesses obtain a license from the city before providing coin-
102. Opinion to the House, 96 A.2d at 630-31.
103. See Wood v. Peckham, 98 A.2d 669, 670 (R.I. 1953) (declaring in the
same year as the advisory opinion of 1953, "It is declared to be a fundamental
principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to
the laws of the state."). See also State v. Pascale, 134 A.2d 149, 151-52 (R.I.
1957) (citing Wood in striking down a conviction for a traffic violation
differing slightly from the state penalty for the same offense); Bertrand v. Di
Carlo, 304 A.2d 658, 659-60 (R.I. 1973) ("It is a well-settled rule that cities
and towns have no power to enact ordinances except those powers from time
to time delegated to them by the Legislature. And it is a fundamental rule of
construction that such powers, being delegated, should be strictly
construed.").
104. Opinion to the House, 96 A.2d at 630-31.
105. 166 A.2d 216 (R.I. 1960).
106. Id. at 218.
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operated jukeboxes or games to the public. 10 7 The court rejected
the city's authority to enact this or any licensing regime. Such a
broad judicially-created prohibition on licensing of local businesses
by home rule municipalities grew out of an interpretation of
Rhode Island's Home Rule Amendment that was significantly
narrower than that of any other home rule jurisdiction at the
time. 108 The court in Newport Amusement Co. reasoned that if
licensing of jukeboxes, or any other kind of licensing, was
considered to be a local matter for purposes of home rule, then
"home rule municipalities would be authorized not only to enact
licensing laws for their localities inconsistent with those enacted
by the legislature on the same matters for the rest of the state, but
also to enact such laws whether the legislature had ever done so
previously on the same subjects or not."10 9
By employing reasoning that seemed driven by a broad
misunderstanding of the purpose and effect of home rule, the court
held that licensing "is the exclusive prerogative of the legislature
except where it has expressly conferred such power upon a city or
town."110 The court here appeared not to consider the possibility
that the Home Rule Amendment was in fact intended to confer
upon municipalities a certain limited ability to enact regulations
not inconsistent with those enacted by the General Assembly. In
other words, a municipality might be granted the authority to
pass its own jukebox licensing ordinances so long as they did not
interfere with any such provisions already in place under state
licensing authority. If the General Assembly saw fit to regulate
jukeboxes, it could subsequently preempt municipal licensing with
its own state jukebox licensing provisions, an outcome which fits
107. Id. at 217.
108. Sandalow, supra note 1, at 684. ("A recent Rhode Island decision
holds, contrary to every other case in which the issue has been presented,
that a home rule municipality does not possess licensing power.") The
reasoning in Newport Amusement Co. ran counter to generally accepted
notions of home rule, even as they were expressed by Rhode Islanders. For
instance, Robert P. Bolan writing for the Bureau of Government Research at
the University of Rhode Island in the same year as the Newport Amusement
Co. decision writes that "[tihe legislature of a home rule city is the successor
to the state legislature in exercising certain powers within its own territory."
ROBERT P. BOLAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF HOME RULE 12 (University of Rhode
Island Bureau of Government Research 1960).
109. Newport Amusement Co., 166 A.2d at 219.
110. Id. at 220.
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with both the spirit and the language of the Home Rule
Amendment.' Having missed this possible via media, and out of
a fear that home rule might allow municipalities to run amok, the
court in this decision adopts an analysis that strictly limits home
rule authority to avoid "a grant of plenary power to enact licensing
laws without regard to the will of the legislature. .".."112 Early
decisions in the vein of Newport Amusement Co. by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court ushered in a period of very limited
authority for municipalities under the Rhode Island Home Rule
Amendment.
As for the limitations that home rule placed on the General
Assembly's power to legislate concerning home rule
municipalities, it is hard to know exactly why, but the Rhode
Island Supreme Court did not have many opportunities to take up
the issue of special legislation in its early home rule decisions. It
did, on occasion, emphasize that the General Assembly retained
nearly complete authority to regulate in areas of local concern, so
long as such legislation was general or specific in nature but
submitted to the qualified voters of the specific municipality in
question. 113 Early on, however, the court either did not see fit to,
or did not have the opportunity to confront special state legislation
in an area of local concern which did not meet the requirements of
the Home Rule Amendment. This might be explained, in part, by
the fact that municipalities had not yet truly come to understand
the significance of the Home Rule Amendment's prohibition on
special legislation, or it might even be that the General Assembly
was especially cautious about obeying the limits of that
Amendment. In any case, the majority of home rule cases which
came before the court up until the late 1980s had the court either
111. See Section IIIC1 for a discussion of the distinction between home
rule and preemption analysis. The rule in Newport Amusement Co. stands
today. See Amico's Inc. v. Mattos, 789 A.2d 899, 903 (R.I. 2002) ("[T]he
General Assembly retains exclusive power over the licensing of Rhode Island
businesses."). See also Nugent v. East Providence, 238 A.2d 758 (R.I. 1968)
(holding that East Providence may not license and regulate cable television);
State v. Krzak, 196 A.2d 417 (R.I. 1964).
112. Newport Amusement Co., 166 A.2d at 219.
113. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Di Carlo, 304 A.2d 658, 659-60 (R.I. 1973).
Accord Providence Lodge No. 3 FOP v. Providence, 730 A.2d 17, 19-20 (R.I.
1999); Marran v. Baird, 635 A.2d 1174, 1178 (R.I. 1994); Mongony v.
Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661, 664 (R.I. 1981).
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invalidating an action by a municipality as not within that
municipality's home rule province, or finding that a law enacted
by the General Assembly was properly general, thus preempting
any conflicting municipal ordinances regardless of the validity of
the ordinance under a home rule charter. 114
As a result of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's narrow
interpretation of home rule and a dearth of cases invalidating
state legislation on home rule grounds, any commentator looking
at the status of home rule in Rhode Island before the late 1980s
would have been hard-pressed to point out exactly how the Home
Rule Amendment had affected municipal initiative, if at all. It is
important to note that this does not mean that changes were not
afoot, or that the growing number of municipalities that chose to
pass a home rule charter were not exercising their newfound
authority, but rather that the extent of that authority could not
easily be determined by looking at the case law.
B. Recent Developments In the Case Law
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's attitude towards home
rule in Rhode Island saw significant development toward a
broader view of the authority granted to home rule municipalities
beginning in the late 1980s. In 1989, the court published two
opinions of significance which made strides in clarifying both the
limitation on special legislation by the General Assembly and the
proper status of municipal home rule initiative. Then, a year later,
the court again invalidated state legislation concerning a home
rule municipality as failing to meet the requirements under the
Home Rule Amendment for passage of special legislation. Finally,
and perhaps most significantly, the court in 1993 issued an
advisory opinion affirming municipal authority over local voting
districts that clearly established the existence of meaningful home
rule initiative under the Amendment. This string of cases, one
could argue, establishes a limited but significant movement in the
direction of greater recognition for municipal initiative and away
from the influence of Dillon's Rule, as exemplified by earlier home
rule decisions in Rhode Island.
The first of these relatively recent decisions, Bruckshaw v.
114. See supra note 103.
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Paolino,1'5 emphasizes the limitation that the Home Rule
Amendment places on special legislation as well as the existence
of local concerns over which municipalities may exercise their
initiative. The underlying dispute in Bruckshaw involved the
passage of a public law by the General Assembly entitled "An Act
Relating To the Retirement Of Employees Of The City Of
Providence," which purported to allow certain Providence city
employees to pay into the Providence employee retirement system
and thereby "buy back credits toward retirement."116 The city
refused to accept applications under this provision, and one of the
affected employees filed for declaratory relief, hoping to force the
city to comply with the legislation. 1 7 The city counterclaimed
seeking declaratory relief and a finding that the public law was
invalid, apparently on a theory that it was a violation of the Home
Rule Amendment.118 In affirming the city's victory in the superior
court, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found both that the
pension plan was a "local matter" and that the public law
modifying it was special legislation that had not been submitted to
the voters of Providence.1 19 The court in Bruckshaw therefore held
that "the 1985 Retirement Act is invalid and unenforceable."1 20
The decision in Bruckshaw was primarily significant because the
court addressed the Home Rule Amendment's prohibition on
special legislation directly, invalidating an act passed by the
General Assembly because it was special legislation which
conflicted with a local home rule ordinance not approved by local
voters. 12' In addition, while the court did not directly address the
initiative power of home rule municipalities, it did point out that
administration of an employee pension plan was at least one "local
concern" over which a home rule municipality may exercise
control. 122 The decision in Bruckshaw primarily reinforced a city's
power to resist special legislation, but it can also be seen as the
first in a series of decisions which give teeth to the Home Rule
115. 557 A.2d 1221, 1223 (R.I. 1989).
116. Id. at 1222.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1223.
120. Id. at 1224.
121. Id. at 1223.
122. Id.
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Amendment.
The second decision in this line of cases, Westerly Residents
for Thoughtful Development, Inc. v. Brancato,123 reinforced the
power of home rule municipalities to act in areas of local concern
under the Home Rule Amendment. In that case, a citizens' group
seeking to prevent expansion of the local sewer system claimed
that the legislation giving the town authority to expand the sewer
system was a violation of the non-delegation doctrine and a
violation of the Home Rule Amendment because the provisions
were not submitted to the voters of Westerly.124 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court turned the argument on its head, holding that the
Westerly home rule charter itself gave the town the power to
expand its own sewer district because "[w]hether a sewer line is
installed on a particular street in the town of Westerly is not of
concern to all the residents of the State of Rhode Island but is of
concern to the residents of the town of Westerly."125 The court,
citing Bruckshaw, reasoned that because the regulation of sewer
lines is a "purely local function," and because the town of Westerly
has a valid home rule charter, that "Westerly's power to expand
and maintain the sewer system is inherent in its home rule
charter." 26 The court simply did not reach the constitutionality of
the state legislation, which was not necessary to grant Westerly's
municipal government authority over the Westerly sewer system
in the first place. 27 In addition, the court in Brancato gave some
guidance as to what concerns might be considered purely local by
noting that such concerns will "directly affect" only the residents
of the locality in question, which was also true for the municipal
pension plan in Bruckshaw.128 The decision in Brancato helps to
define the boundaries of home rule initiative and to expand upon
the notion of local concerns employed in Bruckshaw.
A year later, the court again struck down special legislation in
McCarthy v. Johnson,129 in which the General Assembly passed
legislation extending the notice requirement for a particular
123. 565 A.2d 1662 (R.I. 1989).
124. Id. at 1263.
125. Id. at 1264.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 574 A.2d 1229 (R.I. 1990).
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personal injury claim against the City of Newport. 130 A general
law applicable to all towns and cities in Rhode Island requires
that a claimant, in order to preserve a claim against a city, give
notice to the city within sixty days of the accident. 131 The plaintiff
in McCarthy, who had been injured by a low-hanging branch in
the City of Newport, took eighteen months to give notice to the
city. 132 In response, the General Assembly passed legislation
specific to McCarthy's claim allowing her an extended notice
period.133 The Rhode Island Supreme Court in McCarthy soundly
rejected the plaintiffs argument that extension of notice falls
under the General Assembly's unquestioned authority to confer
jurisdiction, instead finding that the act in question was
"legislation directed at a single home-rule community which
benefits a single party."134 The court reasoned that the special
legislation in that case could not be distinguished from the special
legislation concerning the municipal pension plan in Bruckshaw,
and was therefore invalid. 135 The decision in McCarthy is
important because it carries forward the enforcement of the Home
Rule proscription on special legislation begun in Bruckshaw, and
it does so strongly: "This court has recognized that except as
limited by the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Rhode Island, the powers of the
General Assembly are plenary and unlimited.... However, we are
firmly of the opinion that article XIII, section 4, is such a
limitation."136
The Rhode Island Supreme Court confirmed both the power
granted to home rule municipalities and the firm limitation that
the Home Rule Amendment places on special legislation in an
advisory opinion to the House of Representatives in 1993.137 The
130. Id. at 1229-30.
131. Id. at 1230.
132. Id. at 1229.
133. Id. at 1229-30.
134. Id. at 1232.
135. Id. at 1231.
136. Id. at 1232. (citations omitted).
137. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 628 A.2d
537, 537 (R.I. 1993). This case comes a year after the important decision in
East Greenwich v. O'Neil discussed infra in Part IIIC2. O'Neil is important in
developing an analysis of what concerns are local, and so in that sense the
decision in O'Neil is also recognition of local initiative.
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questions propounded to the court in that case involved a plan by
the House of Representatives to adjust the local voting districts in
the town of Lincoln and remove the then current office holders.138
The questions propounded actually concerned the
constitutionality of the proposed legislation under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 139 The court, however,
refused to address the constitutionality of the apportionment plan
under the Federal Constitution, and instead chose to invalidate
the proposed legislation as a violation of the Home Rule
Amendment. 40 In so doing, the court cited its decisions in both
McCarthy and Bruckshaw for the proposition that an act
pertaining to only one home rule town or city requires the
approval of a majority of the electors of that city. 4 1 The proposed
legislation, the court reasoned, applied only to the town of Lincoln
and had not been approved by the voters of Lincoln, and therefore
was invalid. 142
The court, however, did not stop with the proposed legislation.
It went on to state that the original act by the General Assembly,
passed in 1978, that purported to create the then existing voting
districts was an "unnecessary, meaningless exercise since the
reapportionment plan was enacted locally."143 In other words, the
municipal voting districts in the town of Lincoln exist by virtue of
local authority granted under the Home Rule Amendment, and
any attempt by the General Assembly, past or present, to directly
interfere with those voting districts would be abortive.
The court went on to distinguish the issue of reapportionment
138. The questions were as follows:
1. Is the proposed amendment regarding the members of the school
committee and water board violative of section 1 of article XIV of the
amendments [to] the United States Constitution?
2. Is the proposed amendment regarding the budget board violative
of section 1 of article XIV of the amendments [to] the United States
Constitution?
3. Is the proposed amendment regarding the Democratic and
Republican district committees violative of section 1 of article XIV of
the amendments [to] the United States Constitution?
Id. at 538.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 539.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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from the procedural issues presented in the 1953 advisory opinion,
holding that local districting is "a matter of local interest reserved
by article 13, section 2, to the local government." 144 While the
General Assembly may control procedural matters, such as the
dates and times for general municipal elections, special legislation
concerning apportionment enters into an area where the General
Assembly "retains no authority."145 The court here drew on the
opinions in McCarthy and Bruckshaw to create a firm boundary
for the powers of the General Assembly when it comes to special
legislation. In addition, though this was an advisory opinion to the
House concerning limitations on its authority, the court also
strongly affirmed municipal authority over apportionment for
municipal elections, yet another local concern.146
This discussion of cases leading up to and including the 1993
advisory opinion is not offered as an exhaustive discussion of cases
concerning home rule during that period, but rather to
demonstrate a trend towards a more generous acceptance of the
implications of the Home Rule Amendment for towns and cities in
Rhode Island. As the court has developed a more nuanced
understanding of the concept of home rule, and as the case law
has slowly developed, the court has moved away from the almost
fearful analysis of Newport Amusement Co. to embrace a limited
but robust understanding of home rule in Rhode Island. The result
has not been a complete destruction of the legislature's authority,
as it was preserved under Dillon's Rule, but rather a limited
redistribution of authority between the state and home rule
municipalities in a strictly limited number of areas. The next
section will move from the Rhode Island Supreme Court's slow
acceptance of home rule to a general overview of home rule rubric
as applied by the court today.
C. Present Day Home Rule Analysis
The purpose of this section is to consider exactly how the
Rhode Island Supreme Court goes about analyzing problems and
conflicts involving home rule powers and limitations. Such
problems will generally arise in one of two contexts: either (1)
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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some third party, such as a local resident or industry opposed to
local regulation, will challenge a local ordinance as outside of the
home rule authority of that municipality;147 or (2) the municipality
itself or some party negatively affected by state legislation will
challenge the validity of that legislation claiming that it is
prohibited under the Home Rule Amendment's proscription of
special legislation. In the former circumstance, the question
concerns the limits of authority granted to home rule communities
that have adopted a valid home rule charter. In the latter
circumstance, the question concerns the limitations that the Home
Rule Amendment places on the General Assembly. Before
considering the approach that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
takes in analyzing these two circumstances, an important
distinction between home rule and preemption must be drawn.
1. Distinguishing Home Rule and Preemption
Confusion often arises in Rhode Island between home rule
analysis and preemption analysis.148 It is important to highlight
the relationship between the two concepts to avoid confusion.
While this Comment is not intended as an exhaustive discussion
of preemption, no discussion of home rule is complete without at
least some discussion of preemption. 49 Preemption occurs when a
valid state statute conflicts with a local ordinance. 15 0 In such a
circumstance a state statute will preempt the local ordinance,
rendering it ineffective. 151 In addition, there may be certain areas
147. This is distinct from the issue of whether a municipality has exceeded
the authority granted to it under its own home rule charter. A city's home
rule charter may, of its own right, place limitations on a municipal
government. The issue addressed in this section is whether a municipality
has exceeded the authority granted it by the Home Rule Amendment. A home
rule charter, of course, cannot grant a municipality powers exceeding those
granted to it by the Home Rule Amendment, and so a municipality acting
within the limits of its charter could conceivably still exceed its home rule
authority.
148. "The dueling issues of local authority and state preeminence often
intersect because home rule requires an analysis of whether the issue is of
local concern, whereas preemption requires an analysis of whether the issue
is implicitly reserved within the state's sole domain." Amico's v. Mattos, 789
A.2d 899, 908 (R.I. 2002).
149. See, e.g., Thomas S. Smith, No Home on the Range for Home Rule, 31
LAND & WATER L. REV. 791, 800-01 (1996).
150. Id. at 800.
151. 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
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of regulation which are entirely occupied by the state, and in
which a municipality may not regulate. This second form of
preemption, where a state legislature "occupies the field" in a
particular area of regulation without necessarily stating its
intention to do so, will be referred to hereinafter as "implied
preemption." 152 There are two important distinctions to keep in
mind concerning the relationship between these two forms of
preemption and home rule in Rhode Island.
First, the only absolute limitation on preemption under the
Home Rule Amendment is that no state legislation may modify a
municipality's form of government. 153 Home rule protects local
ordinances against preemption only in the sense that it renders
special legislation invalid if it is not in conformity with the
provisions of the Amendment. 54 The key to home rule, therefore,
lies in the limitation on the power of the General Assembly to
legislate, and therefore in the validity of state legislation. Valid
state legislation will always preempt a conflicting local
ordinance.155
Second, concerning implied preemption, the legislature cannot
occupy the field in an area of local concern.'5 6 The two are
necessarily and mutually exclusive. The flip side of this
relationship is that a municipal ordinance which is impliedly
preempted cannot be protected from preemption by the Home Rule
Amendment. Put simply, a court may decide either (a) that a
Subdivisions § 111 (2004).
152. Id. § 113 (discussing "matters of statewide concern" upon which a
municipality may not legislate). The relationship between home rule and
preemption is highly complex. For instance, treatises often make general
statements about the limitations on judicial interpretation in areas of "mixed
state and local concern," but such statements are often inapplicable in Rhode
Island. Compare id. § 114 ("[Albsent a specific limitation or declaration by the
legislature to the contrary, [constitutional home rule] is intended to
diminish... [preemption] by a judicial interpretation of an unexpressed
legislative intent."), with East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 109 (R.I.
1992) ("We have long recognized the doctrine of implied pre-emption and do
not require a clear statement by the Legislature of its intention to pre-empt
local legislation.").
153. R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (1986).
154. Judith A. Stoll, Note, Home Rule and the Sherman Act After Boulder:
Cities Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 259, 263-65
(1983).
155. Id. at 264-65.
156. East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 109 (R.I. 1992).
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matter is of local concern and thus the state has not occupied the
field concerning that particular matter, or, in the converse, (b)
that the state has occupied the field and thus the particular
matter cannot be of local concern. 157 This relationship is merely a
function of the definition of "local concern." Confusion arises
because the case law does not always keep this distinction clear. 158
Strictly speaking, a home rule amendment which is impliedly
preempted was not valid in the first place. Ultimately, it makes
little difference in the implied preemption context whether we say
(inaccurately) that a home rule ordinance is preempted because
the state occupies the field, or if we say (accurately) that the
ordinance does not regulate a local concern and therefore is
outside the power granted by the Home Rule Amendment, so long
as the distinction between preemption and home rule remains
generally clear. 159
Combining these two distinctions, it should be clear that
preemption and home rule often arise in the same context. 160 They
are not, however, the same kind of inquiry. Preemption concerns
the supremacy of valid state legislation, while home rule concerns
a particular constitutional limitation on state legislation in the
face of constitutionally-created municipal initiative. 161 These are
important distinctions to keep in mind when considering how
courts will respond to conflicts between municipal and state
legislation. 162
2. Municipal Powers: What Concerns Are Local Concerns?
Home rule analysis concerning the validity of municipal and
state legislation often begins with the same question: what
matters are of purely local concern? 163 This is partly because
home rule initiative has been granted to municipalities in areas
where the General Assembly later chooses to pass some form of
special legislation. The result is that the analysis of the two issues
157. Id.
158. Id. at 111.
159. Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1261 (1999).
160. Amico's v. Mattos, 789 A.2d 899, 908 (R.I. 2002).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id.; accord East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 109 (R.I.
1992).
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begins with the same question: Is the challenged legislation
regulating in an area of concern over which home rule
municipalities have been granted local initiative?6 4 In the case of
municipal regulation, this is really the ultimate question, while in
the case of challenged state legislation it is one in a series of
questions. 165 An analysis of the validity of state legislation
challenged under the Home Rule Amendment has at least one
remaining step. This is so because special state legislation is valid
so long as it conforms to the powers retained by the General
Assembly under the state's constitution, and because the Home
Rule Amendment limits, but does not prohibit, special
legislation.166 The key is that authority is granted to a
municipality, either by the constitution or the General Assembly,
while it is reserved to the General Assembly.167 This is a
significant distinction to keep in mind when considering how the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island is likely to rule on a particular
home rule conflict.
The first step, and often the primary concern, in all home rule
analyses in Rhode Island is the determination of whether a
particular concern is purely local. As Parts IIA and IIB of this
Comment make clear, the development of this question in Rhode
Island has been tentative, if not almost glacial, in its pace. It has
not been fruitless by any means, however, as the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has developed rules over time which were finally
combined into a single analysis in Town of East Greenwich v.
O'Neil.1 68 The underlying dispute in O'Neil concerned a local
ordinance passed by East Greenwich, a home rule municipality,
which prohibited the construction of high voltage transmission
164. See Amico's, 789 A.2d at 908.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 904.
167. This interpretation might, at first glance, appear to be the same as
the conclusion reached under Dillon's Rule. It is similar in so far as it
reinforces the notion that a municipality is merely a creature of the state. It
is different, however, because the Home Rule Amendment does grant
initiative authority to home rule municipalities. Home rule municipalities are
not limited in their authority by necessity or specific grant, as they would be
under Dillon's Rule, but rather limited to an entire class of concerns, namely
those that are purely local.
168. 617 A.2d 104 (R.I. 1992).
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lines. 169  The city cited health concerns surrounding
electromagnetic emissions from high voltage power lines in
support of the ordinance, which created a three-year moratorium
on construction of such lines.170 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
invalidated the ordinance because regulation of electric
transmission lines is clearly a field which has been occupied by
the state legislature. 171 In reaching its decision, the court
formulated a rubric which I will refer to as the O'Neil test. The
three-part O'Neil test is intended to "more clearly discern[]" what
the court refers to as the "local-general equation." 17 2 In the words
of the court, the three steps are as follows:
First, when it appears that uniform regulation
throughout the state is necessary or desirable, the matter
is likely to be within the state's domain.
Second, whether a particular matter is traditionally
within the historical domain of one entity is a substantial
consideration.
Third, and most critical, if the action of a municipality
has a significant effect upon people outside the home rule
town or city, the matter is apt to be deemed one of
statewide concern. 173
Each of these steps was derived from general home rule
principles as they have been interpreted in Rhode Island, and
each requires further discussion. 174
The first prong involves the desirability of uniform regulation
throughout the state in certain limited areas. 175 In many ways,
this prong was covered by the discussion supra concerning the
169. Id. at 106.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 112.
172. Id. at 111.
173. Id. (citations omitted).
174. Interestingly, the Court cites, but then spends little time discussing
the development of Rhode Island's case law. In addition, the court only cites a
treatise in support of the first prong. One reason might lie in the Court's
recognition that the case law leading up to O'Neil is confusing, which it
points out when it states that "the local-general equation may be more
clearly discerned." Concern about the clarity of past decisions might well
explain any reluctance on the Court's part to discuss previous decisions. Id.
175. Id.
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distinction between preemption and home rule.176 In essence, the
court was merely stating that a local concern cannot be one which
is occupied by the state. Considering, however, that the court, in
Newport Amusement Co., at the inception of home rule in Rhode
Island appeared convinced that the state occupied virtually every
conceivable field of regulation, this is an important prong in home
rule analysis in Rhode Island. 177 Since O'Neil, the court has been
circumspect about declaring any particular field to be one in which
statewide uniformity is desirable; this is despite the fact that the
court in O'Neil did find that regulation of public utilities was an
area in which uniform statewide regulation is desirable.178
Following O'Neil, most decisions concerning uniform regulation
have involved relatively clear cases, such as child support 79 or
regulation of tidal wetlands. 80 In less clear cases, the court has
generally based its ultimate conclusion on a variety of
foundations.' 8 ' Ultimately, the court will inquire into the quality
of the thing being regulated to decide if statewide uniformity is
especially desirable. 182 For instance, the court is quite likely to
find that regulation of agriculture to prevent pollution of
waterways is an area that cannot be effectively regulated without
statewide uniformity, while the court is unlikely to find that
effective regulation of parking on municipal streets requires a
176. See supra Part IIIC1.
177. Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 166 A.2d 216, 219 (R.I. 1960).
178. See East Greenwich v. Narragansett Electric Co., 651 A.2d 725, 729
(R.I. 1994) (citing O'Neil for the proposition that public utilities are an area of
statewide concern).
179. Duke v. Duke, 675 A.2d 822, 823-24 (R.I. 1996) ("Child support is a
statewide concern that a municipal ordinance may not impede or frustrate in
its implementation.").
180. Warren, 740 A.2d at 1259 ("Under the public-trust doctrine, 'the state
holds title to all land below the high water mark in a proprietary capacity for
the benefit of the public."' (citations omitted)).
181. See generally Marran v. Baird 635 A.2d 1174 (R.I. 1994) (upholding
state legislation allowing the director of the State Department of
Administration to appoint a "budget and review commission" to oversee
municipal financial policy if a town's bonds are lowered to junk status).
182. See, e.g., Coastal Recycling v. Connors, 854 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I. 2004)
(Chief Justice Williams writing for the court in Coastal rejected an argument
that the state occupied the field of regulation for municipal contracts. "Such
an interpretation is at odds with the Home Rule amendment of the Rhode
Island Constitution... [tihus, we must read the towns ordinance in pari
materia with [state legislation]."
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uniform statewide policy. In between the extremes the court
would be required to make a case-by-case determination.
The second prong of the O'Neil test requires the court to look
at the traditional distribution of power between the state and
municipal governments, and to give deference to that traditional
scheme.18 3 This prong is essentially a way to avoid sudden change
in the distribution of power. The O'Neil court cited cases from the
early years of Rhode Island home rule to support the need for this
particular prong, the latest one being from 1971, and included the
1953 advisory opinion to the House.18 4 This prong preserves the
status quo in areas such as licensing and authority over police
personnel. 8 5 Regardless of the reasoning in any particular case
establishing a precedent, the court is apt to preserve the historical
balance between state and municipal governments, or to at least
proceed cautiously in changing that balance. The danger, of
course, is that this particular prong will be used to preserve the
strictures of Dillon's Rule based on its historical acceptance. As for
whether this concern is warranted, only time will tell.'8 6
The final prong in the O'Neil test, and the one the court refers
to as the "most critical," involves the fundamental limitation of
home rule authority to a single municipality's property and
affairs. 8 7 This prong stands in opposition to the second prong in
that it actually recognizes a relatively broad area of authority,
namely anything that does not affect people outside of the home
rule town or city. In fact, the court cited three cases in support of
this prong, all of which come from the later, more generous period
in the court's home rule analysis as discussed in Part IIIB.188 The
tension between this prong and the second prong might not
present itself clearly at first glance since the third prong is
183. East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 111 (R.I. 1992).
184. Id. The court cites the following cases: Marro v. Gen. Treasurer of the
City of Cranston, 273 A.2d 660, 662 (R.I. 1971); Nugent v. East Providence,
238 A.2d 758, 761-63 (R.I. 1968); Opinion to the House of Representatives, 96
A.2d 627, 630 (1953).
185. See, e.g., Marran, 635 A.2d at 1179 ("The aggregate indebtedness of a
city or town has been historically regulated by statutes of general
applicability.").
186. If Rhode Island's past is any gauge, only a great deal of time will tell.
187. O'Neil, 617 A.2d at 111.
188. Id. The court cited the following cases in support of the third prong:
McCarthy 574 A.2d at 1231; Brancato, 565 A.2d at 1264; and Bruckshaw, 557
A.2d at 1223.
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presented in terms of a limitation on the authority of home rule
municipalities, but the limitation stated in the third prong is
really just part of the definition of home rule. Of course, a home
rule municipality may not regulate in a way that affects people
outside of the home rule community; otherwise the issue would
not be a local concern by definition. This supposed limitation
might actually support an expansion of home rule authority, over
time, by reinforcing the fundamental home rule notion that a
municipal government has the authority to act on its own
initiative, so long as such action affects only the residents of that
home rule community. It is perhaps telling that the court pointed
to this as the "most critical" prong of the three, especially given
the cases cited in support of this particular prong.18 9
The establishment of the O'Neil test is by far the most
significant development in Rhode Island's recent home rule
jurisprudence. O'Neil establishes the local-general equation as the
centerpiece of home rule analysis in Rhode Island, and it provides
a definite starting point for home rule municipalities in
determining what the limits of their authority under the Home
Rule Amendment are likely to be. 190 It also provides a starting
point for the General Assembly in determining what limitations
the Home Rule Amendment places on its authority to legislate
concerning home rule municipalities. 191 The next sub-section will
discuss determination of the validity of state legislation under the
Home Rule Amendment.
3. Restrictions on State Legislation
As discussed above, the Home Rule Amendment acts as a
limitation on the General Assembly's otherwise plenary
authority.192 Setting aside for the moment the absolute
proscription of legislation affecting form of municipal government,
the validity of state legislation in Rhode Island under the Home
Rule Amendment depends upon three interrelated factors: (1) the
status of the municipality, (2) the type of legislation, general or
specific, and (3) the procedure by which legislation has been
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
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passed. 193 The first of these is a threshold question which
determines whether the Home Rule Amendment limitations are
relevant, the second is very much related to the local-general
equation raised in the previous section, and the final factor will
only be relevant if the legislation in question is special legislation
relating to a home rule community. The following discussion will
therefore address each factor in order.
The Home Rule Amendment only restricts state legislation as
it relates to towns and cities which have adopted a home rule
charter, referred to in this Comment as "home rule
municipalities."'194 The Home Rule Amendment places no
restrictions on special legislation relating to municipalities which
have no home rule charter.195 These communities are still subject
to the will of the legislature and receive all their authority from
the General Assembly. 196  Dillon's Rule, with its strict
interpretation of municipal authority, applies in full force to these
communities. 197
The second factor involves determining whether a particular
instance of legislation is to be considered special or general. This
question is of great significance, since the state retains nearly
complete power to legislate by general legislation. 198 The Home
Rule Amendment does not restrict this power, except as it relates
to form of government. 199 The process for determining whether
193. Opinion to the House of Representatives, 87 A.2d 693, 695-96 (R.I.
1952).
194. See Capone v. Nunes, 132 A.2d 80, 82 (R.I. 1957). Accord Opinion to
the House, 87 A.2d at 695 ("Generally speaking, unless a charter is submitted
to and is adopted by the qualified electors of a city or town in accordance with
the provisions of the home rule amendment, article XXXVIII, such city or
town retains the same status relative to the general assembly as that which
it had prior to the adoption of said amendment.").
195. See Capone, 132 A.2d at 82.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661, 664 (R.I. 1981) ("[A] state
law of general character and statewide application is paramount to any local
or municipal ordinance inconsistent therewith."). It again becomes clear why
the distinction between preemption and home rule becomes difficult. This
proposition concerning a general law of statewide character is perhaps more
significant in terms of preemption, but it also holds a kernel of truth for home
rule analysis in that preemption applies despite the existence of home rule.
In other words, the Home Rule Amendment does not prevent state legislation
from preempting valid home rule ordinances in this instance.
199. Opinion to the House of Representatives, 87 A.2d at 695-96.
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legislation is general or specific is basically two-fold. First,
legislation will usually only be considered special legislation if it
actually encroaches on an area of purely local concern in a
particular home rule community.200 The basic idea is that the
Home Rule Amendment only grants local authority in areas of
purely local concern, and, as such, the Amendment is not
implicated if the state has not interfered in such concerns. 20'
Second, legislation regulating in an area that might otherwise be
of purely local concern will not be considered special legislation if
it "shall apply alike to all cities and towns."202 This determination
is relatively straightforward: either the legislation in question
affects all towns and cities alike, or it does not. Legislation will
therefore be considered special legislation only if it regulates in an
area of purely local concern and does not apply alike to all towns
and cities in Rhode Island. 20 3 If, at the end of this analysis, the
legislation in question is general and does not affect form of
government, then it is valid.
The final factor in determining the validity of state legislation
under the Home Rule Amendment will only be reached if the
legislation is special legislation under the second factor. If it is
special legislation, it can still be valid if it is submitted to and
ratified by a majority of the qualified electors of the town or city to
which it applies. 204 This provision allows the General Assembly to
act as a catalyst for local initiatives, forcing a vote on issues on
which the local government has not acted. This device is most
frequently employed to ratify special legislation waiving the state
legislative cap on damages in tort suits against municipalities,
and it has been employed with very limited success. 205
200. See, e.g., Royal v. Barry, 160 A.2d 572, 575-76 (R.I. 1960).
201. Id.
202. Bruckshaw v. Paolino, 557 A.2d 1221, 1223 (R.I. 1989) (quoting
article XIII section 4 of the Rhode Island Constitution).
203. It is worth noting that the relationship between municipal home rule
authority and the limitations on state legislation is not symmetrical. Home
rule never grants a Rhode Island municipality the authority to pass
ordinances in areas of statewide concern, while the General Assembly can
legislate in areas of purely local concern, so long as it does so with a general
law of uniform statewide application. This is yet another example of the close
relationship between home rule and preemption in Rhode Island.
204. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Johnson, 574 A.2d 1229, 1232 (R.I. 1990).
Accord Bruckshaw, 557 A.2d at 1223; Opinion to the House, 87 A.2d at 696.
205. See, e.g., McCarthy, 574 A.2d at 1232.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Rhode Island's courts and legislatures have been slow to
recognize the benefits in efficient and effective government that
the Home Rule Amendment has to offer. This is not surprising
when one considers the power that such a historically unified and
powerful General Assembly stands to lose. Yet the overwhelming
logic of allowing local authorities the ability to make decisions
affecting only their constituents cannot be ignored. This is
probably why Rhode Island's half-century experiment with
constitutional home rule has been marked by reluctant but
persistent acceptance of local initiative. Beginning with near
rejection of home rule in Newport Amusement Co. and progressing
to the court's much broader conception of home rule in O'Neil, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has begun to develop an analysis
which can allow for the realization of much broader municipal
authority. If this trend is to continue, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court must continue to act as an independent arbiter in clashes
between state and local power to ensure that the spirit of home
rule is not hobbled by the desire to preserve historically
entrenched power.206
206. A recent supreme court decision in a case challenging authority
granted by a charter to a town council to reject or accept decisions made
under state legislation, suggests that home rule will continue its slow
progression forward using the O'Neil test as a guide:
Coastal contends the Legislature intended to occupy the field by
creating a uniform system to award municipal contracts. Such an
interpretation strips town councils throughout the state of any
opportunity to review major decisions that will cost their
municipality a significant amount of money. Such an interpretation
is at odds with the Home Rule amendment of the Rhode Island
Constitution, which confers "the right of self government in all local
matters." R.I. Const. art. 13, sec. 1. Nothing in [the law in question]
proscribes the town councils from reviewing a decision made by a
purchasing agent in accordance with the statute. Thus, we must
read the town's ordinance and charter in pari materia with [that
law].
Coastal Recycling v. Connors, 854 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I. 2004). See also supra
note 182.
CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE
Taking a broader historical view, this slow progression of
home rule is probably just a reluctant recognition of a persistent
fact of Rhode Island's history, that the towns came first.
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